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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ; 
Plaintiff - Respondent, ] 
vs. ] 
PATRICK JOHN BRASSELL, ] 
Defendant - Appellant. ] 
) Case No. 890305-CA 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a final judgment in a criminal case pursuant to Rule 
3, Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals and 77-35-26, Utah Code Annotated. 
This is an appeal following stipulated conditional pleas of guilty to three 
counts of robbery, second degree felonies, the conditions of which allowed the defendant 
to enter said pleas but reserve his right to appeal and, if successful on appeal, to have 
his case remanded for dismissal. The said pleas were entered following the court's denial 
of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
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There is a dispute between the parties as to whether the stipulation was 
limited to a single narrow issue; i.e., denial of a timely preliminary hearing, (claimed by 
the State), or, as claimed by Defendant, broader issues of denial of rights to speedy 
preliminary hearing, trial and other proceedings. 
The court below accepted the conditional pleas and later ruled that appeal 
should be limited to the preliminary examination issue. 
Defendant's Notice of Appeal was filed May 10, 1989. (R. 221) 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Is there sufficient "good cause shown" for an extension of the 
preliminary examination "ten-day rule" where: 
a. There are no clear findings of fact in support thereof? 
b. The three extensions thereof are based upon: 
(1) Miscommunication by the prosecutor's office? 
(2) The prosecution's speculative claims that a witness whose 
testimony is both cumulative and uncertain may be unavailable 
for a hearing scheduled five days hence? 
(3) The court's planned attendance at a judicial conference? 
2. Should this court hear the issue of cumulative or post-preliminary 
hearing denial of speedy trial rights where the record of the terms of the 
conditional plea agreement are ambiguous and/or the record is silent? 
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3. Was the approximate two-month delay in securing an arraignment a 
sufficient basis to hold that a denial of Defendant's right to a speedy trial 
occurred? 
4. Were the cumulative delays herein a violation of Defendant's Speedy 
Trial rights? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES AND RULES 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Article I 
Section 7 -
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
Section 12 -
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have 
the right . . . to have a speedy public trial. . . . 
Section 13 -
Offenses heretofore required to be ~ osecuted by 
indictment, shall be prosecuted b} information 
after examination and commitment by a 
magistrate, unless the examination be waived 
by the accused. . . . 
STATUTES 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
3 
77-35-7. Rule 7 - Proceedings before magistrate 
(7) If a defendant is charged with a felony, he 
may not be called on to plead before the com-
mitting magistrate. During the initial 
appearance before the magistrate, the defendant 
shall be advised of his right to a preliminary 
examination. . . . If the defendant does not 
waive a preliminary examination, the magistrate 
shall schedule the preliminary examination. The 
examination shall be held within a reasonable 
time, but not later than ten days if the defen-
dant is in custody for the offense charged. . . . 
These time periods may be extended by the 
magistrate for good cause shown. 
77-1-6. Rights of defendant 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is 
entitled: 
(h) To be admitted to bail in 
accordance with provisions of law, 
or be entitled to a trial within 30 
days after arraignment if unable to 
post bail and if the business of the 
court permits. 
77-35-25. Rule 25 
(a) In its discretion, for substantial cause and in furtherance 
of justice, the court may, either on its own initiative or upon 
application of either party, order an information or indictment 
dismissed. 
(b) The court shall dismiss the information or indictment 
when: 
(1) There is unreasonable or unconstitutional 
delay in bringing defendant to trial; 
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(4) The court is without jurisdiction; or 
(5) The prosecution is barred by the statute of 
limitations. 
(d) If the dismissal is based upon the grounds that there was 
unreasonable delay, or the court is without jurisdiction, . . . 
further prosecution for the offense shall not be barred and the 
court may make such orders with respect to the custody of 
the defendant pending the filing of new charges as the 
interest of justice may require. Otherwise the defendant shall 
be discharged and bail exonerated. 
An order of dismissal based upon unconstitutional delay in 
bringing the defendant to trial or based upon the statute of 
limitations, shall oe a bar to any other prosecution for the 
offense charged. 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
Amendment V: 
No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law;. . . . 
Amendment VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
to a speedy and public trial, . . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On March 19, 1986, the Murray, Utah branch of Western Savings and Loan 
was robbed by two men, one of them armed. Money was taken from three separate 
tellers. (R. 76). 
On May 17, 1988 a warrant of arrest issued for Defendant Brassell, 
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pursuant to a Criminal Information charging him with three counts of Aggravated 
Robbery in violation of 76-8-309, first degree felonies and one count of being a Habitual 
Criminal. Brassell was alleged therein to be the unarmed suspect. (R. 5-8). 
On May 25, 1988 the State of Utah requested Defendant's extradition from 
the Commonwealth of Virginia, Defendant's home state. He was arrested and jailed in 
Virginia on June 1, 1988, whereafter a hearing resulted in his extradition to Utah, 
(ordered August 10, 1988). He was booked into the Salt Lake County Jail on September 
9, 1988, then appeared before Judge Paul Grant (first appearance) on September 12, 
1988, whereat a "calendar call" appearance was set before Judge Dennis Fuchs for 
September 20, 1988. (R. 76-77). 
Subsequent appearances before Judge Fuchs on September 20th and Judge 
Floyd Gowans on September 22nd resulted in a preliminary examination date of October 
6, 1988, 24 days after the first appearance. (See Argument I, infra, for details and 
objections to continuances.) 
Although Defendant was under parole supervision in Virginia, no detainer 
("parole hold") was filed against him at any time while in custody in Utah. (See R. 89). 
Judge Gowans also refused to allow a reduction of Defendant's bail or order 
his pre-trial release in spite of his preliminary hearing being extended beyond the ten day 
limit. (R. 78). 
Following Defendant's preliminary hearing before Judge Michael Hutchings. 
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October 6, 1988, he was bound over to the Third District Court, arraignment set for 
October 17, 1988, before Judge John Rokich. (R. 78). On said date, Judge Rokich 
recused himself and ordered the matter reassigned. (R. 257). 
Between October 24 and November 28, 1988, Defendant's counsel, (and 
counsel's secretary), made numerous telephone calls and personal appearances at the 
District Court in futilely attempting to get an arraignment re-set. (R. 257). 
On November 29, 1988 counsel sent a letter requesting an immediate 
setting (R. 246) whereafter an arraignment was finally held before Judge Raymond S. 
Uno on December 12, 1988, a full 68 days after bindover. Trial was set for February 1, 
1989. Defendant renewed his objections to the previous delays and was advised by the 
court to file the objections by written motion. 
On January 27, 1989, the court vacated the February 1, 1989 trial date due 
to an ongoing murder trial in said court and re-set the trial for March 7, 1989, (R. 266), 
but re-set again for March 21, 1989. 
On February 16, 1989, Defendant filed six pre-trial motions, one of which 
was entitled "Motion to Dismiss Re: Pre-Trial Delays." (R. 25, 74). On March 13, 
1989, the court took Defendant's motions and both parties' written memoranda under 
advisement, heard additional argument on March 14th, then denied Defendant's motions. 
(R. 266-267; 240). 
Following denial of his motions, Defendant entered into a plea bargain 
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agreement wherein: 
a. State would dismiss Count IV: 
b. State would amend Counts I, II and III to "simple" robbery, second 
degree felonies (from " aggravated", firsts); 
c. Defendant would enter "conditional pleas" to all three charges; 
d. Defendant would preserve issues on appeal as condition of plea and if 
successful, could withdraw pleas when conviction(s) reversed. 
However, the parties dispute the facts as to limits of issues on conditional 
appeal: 
a. Defendant Claims: He could appeal from the denial of his Motion to 
Dismiss for Pre-Trial Delays, (which included three primary issues: I- Delay in 
Preliminary Hearing; II- Delay form Bindover to Trial; and, III- Cumulative Delay); but 
had waived his right to conditional appeal from denial of his other five motions. 
b. Plaintiff Claims: Appeal is limited to issue "I" of Defendant's Pre-Trial 
Delay motion, i.e., the delay at the preliminary hearing stage only regarding the "ten-
day rule." 
Prior to the conditional pleas be entered, the Defendant executed the 
"Statement of Defendant" which purports to set forth the terms and conditions of the 
plea; however, said statement is silent as to which issue, (preliminary hearing only v. 
delays, generally), is appealable under the agreement. (R. 208-214.) 
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Defendant's affidavit (R. 253) claims the latter, as does counsel's (R. 255). 
The transcript of March 14, 1989 may be interpreted either way: (R. 240) 
(P. 3. 1. 17) 
MR. WALSH: (Regarding conditional plea and appeal) . . . 
only one issue that we are talking about now that would 
require a ruling from the court; and that would be with 
respect to the denial of his speedy . . . I guess it's part of the 
speedy trial motion that Mr. DeLand filed. . . . with respect 
to the violation of the ten day . . . (1. 24.) 
fP. 3. 1. 25) 
(Still Mr. Walsh): That is -- isn't that the motion, Loni, that 
they want to be considered on appeal and that would be part 
of the conditional plea? 
MR. DeLAND: It is, Your Honor, (p. 4, 1. 3) 
(The court then denies the entire Motion regarding pre-trial delays at lines 
10-12 and then specifically addresses the section on the ten day rule at page 4, line 25 
to page 5 line 10.) 
On page 6, lines 8 to 13, Mr. DeLand states that he did not hear (Mr. 
Walsh's) representations as to the conditional plea. 
The dispute between the parties as to the scope of appealable issues came 
before Judge Uno for hearing on November 17, 1989, at which time the court ruled that 
the appeal, per the conditional plea agreement, was limited to the preliminary hear-
ing/"ten~day rule" extension only, per order dated December 4, 1989. (R. 273-274). 
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Although Defendant's Notice of Appeal was filed on May 10, 1989, the 
same has been delayed by post-trial motions and the inability of the District Court to 
supply this court with the entire record. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. Defendant/Appellant Brassell argues that the undisputed denial of his 
statutory right to a preliminary hearing within ten days of his first appearance was 
ordered unreasonably and without good cause shown thereby depriving him of certain 
statutory and due process rights under state and federal law and constitutional provisions 
for which the appropriate remedy is remand and dismissal. 
II. Brassell also claims a right to appeal the additional and cumulative 
denial of his right to a speedy trial and/or other proceedings (although the state disputes 
that the conditional plea herein reserved the broader right to appeal.) 
Brassell asserts that the court erred in ruling that the record supports the 
State's position where the record is silent and/or ambiguous on point. And in the event 
this court agrees that this appeal ought to extend to the cumulative delay issue, Brassell 
argues that even if the denial of a speedy preliminary hearing, standing alone, does not 
require remand for dismissal, the cumulative denial of the right to speedy proceedings 
does warrant said remedy. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT WAS DENIED THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY 
PRELIMINARY HEARING WITHOUT GOOD CAUSE 
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Rule 7, Section 77-35-7, Utah Code of Criminal Procedure, states in 
pertinent part: 
(4) The magistrate having jurisdiction over the 
offense charged shall, upon the defendant's first 
appearance . . . 
(7) (a) . . . the defendant shall be advised of his 
right to a preliminary examination. 
(b) If the defendant does not waive a prelimi-
nary examination, the magistrate shall schedule 
the preliminary examination. The examination 
shall be held within a reasonable time, but not 
later than ten days if the defendant is in custody. 
. . . These time periods may be extended by the 
magistrate for good cause shown. 
The defendant's first appearance before a magistrate, as defined in Rule 
7(4), was on September 12, 1988, before Judge Paul G. Grant one of the 15 judges of 
the Third Circuit Court, Salt Lake County. At that hearing the defendant appeared 
without counsel but did not waive his right to a preliminary hearing. Judge Grant then 
set the matter for "Roll Call" (predisposition), rather than a preliminary hearing, before 
Judge Dennis Fuchs, for September 20, 1988. (R. 3). 
Defendant appeared before Judge Fuchs on September 20, 1988; however, 
his retained counsel was absent due to an illness. The record is in conflict as to what 
occurred before Judge Fuchs. 
A. The Docket Sheet (R. 3) shows that Roll Call was continued to 
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September 22, 1988 before Judge Floyd H. Gowans by stipulation, the state being 
represented by Robert L. Stott, Deputy County Attorney; 
B. The transcript of the September 20, 1988, proceedings (R. 243, p.2) 
reflects that Scott W. Reed, Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney represented the state and 
that the matter was indeed continued as stated above; however, 
C. The affidavits of Mr. Reed (R. 263), defense counsel, Mr. Loni F. 
DeLand (R. 255) and Ms. Diane Monseret (R. 261) attest that Mr. Reed obtained a 
preliminary hearing date of September 27, 1988, (perhaps in addition to the September 
22nd Roll Call), and telephoned Ms. Monseret (Mr. DeLand's secretary) with said 
preliminary hearing date, who calendared the same, which hearing was to be before 
Judge Fuchs. Judge Fuchs' clerk confirmed the same with Mr. DeLand (R. 244). 
On Thursday, September 22, 1988, the parties appeared for Roll call before 
Judge Gowans, (the state represented by Deputy David Walsh) whereat it was deter-
mined that Judge Fuchs had no preliminary hearings set for September 27th and that the 
matter was not yet set before any judge for preliminary examination. (R. 244, pp. 2, 6, 
7). 
Defense counsel (DeLand) initially advised the court that Tuesday, 
September 27th was acceptable for preliminary hearing; however Mr. Walsh represented 
that a "critical (identification) witness," (Mr. Eugene Garrett), was in California and 
could only be reached in the evening and that it was doubtful that a Tuesday hearing 
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would give the state ample time to arrange for his appearance. (R. 244, pp. 2-3). 
Further, Mr. Walsh argued for an extension of time on the basis that both sides would 
benefit from a line-up and that it was "doubtful" that the jail could accommodate a line-
up by the following Tuesday. (R. 244, p.3). Mr. Walsh added that Mr. Garrett needed 
to be at both the line-up and the preliminary hearing so not only were the time 
constraints onerous but that it would also be inconvenient to the witness, the jail and 
the state to hold two line-ups. (One for the three eyewitness/tellers and another for 
Garrett). (R. 244, p. 3-4). 
For the above stated reasons, Mr. Walsh requested of defense counsel a 
continuance to the next Thursday (October 5 th); however, defense counsel declined on 
the basis that the defendant was already beyond ten days in jail and that, aftei all, the 
state had three eyewitnesses who were local (tellers) (R. 244, p. 3); that the fourth 
(Garrett) had been quoted in police reports as saying that he wasn't sure he could 
identify anyone (R. 244, p.6); and that the problems of getting his witness to court on 
"only" five days notice wasn't persuasive: (R. 244, p.4): 
THE COURT: Well, I'll certainly be happy to 
sign (an order for a Tuesday, September 27th 
lineup), but that doesn't solve Mr. Walsh's 
problems if he can't get that witness here by 
Tuesday morning. 
MR DeLAND: Yeah. And of course, Mr. Walsh's 
problem is not real high on my priority list. 
Well, he's got three other witnesses . . . and I've 
got a client in jail. . . . 
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The court then inquired of Mr. Walsh about whether Mr. Garrett's tes-
timony would be any different than the other three eyewitnesses and Mr. Walsh 
eventually responded, "I don't know, I haven't been able to talk to him." (R. 244, p. 5 
at lines 22 - 23). 
(NOTE: As it turned out, all four witnesses eventually appeared at the 
line-up and preliminary hearing, both of which were held on October 6th, and none of 
the four witnesses could identify Defendant and, in fact, one identified the "wrong 
person." (See R. 241, pp. 17, 35, 47 and 56, et. seq.).) 
Judge Gowans then said, ''Well, of course, the statute provides that I can 
extend it (preliminary examination) past the ten days for good cause, and I suppose 
good cause is certainly if a witness is not available." (R. 244, p.6 at lines 4-6). Mr 
DeLand then requested the court, (since the court was granting the extension), grant 
only a two day extension to Thursday, September 29th, (a full week beyond the ten-day 
limit). Mr. DeLand advised the court that his next open dates were October 5th and 6th 
and said, "I don't want to wait that long." The following discussion then occurred (R. 
244, p. 7) wherein the court denied defense counsel's request and set the hearing for 
October 6, 1988, a full 24 days after the defendant's first appearance: 
THE COURT: Well, I can do it on the 4th. 
MR. DeLAND: That's still not very close. We've 
got nothing next week? 
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THE COURT: Well, it's the judicial conference. 
MR. DeLAND: Why do you have to have all 
these conferences? You understand the 
problem? 
MR. WALSH: Yeah. The 4th would be fine for 
us, Judge. 
THE COURT: But apparently it's not for Mr. 
DeLand. I can go- - (to the 6th). 
In summary, Rule 7 required a preliminary examination in this case not 
later than September 22, 1988. Arguably, the defendant cannot complain of the original 
setting of the 27th since his agreement may be perceived as a waiver. 
However, Defendant relied on the undisputed representations of a deputy 
(Mr. Reed) of the county attorney's office as to the 27th being firm. But then, on the 
22nd, yet another deputy prosecutor (Mr. Walsh) asked for additional time citing possible 
inconvenience to a witness and possible difficulty in arranging for a line-up with the jail 
staff. The record reflects that the state's prosecutor had not even talked to his out of 
state witness nor attempted to schedule a line-up and therefor only speculated that five 
days did not give the state time to arrange for the witness' appearance and/or the line-
up. On those facts, defense counsel would not waive his scheduled hearing date (27th); 
however, the judge ostensibly found good cause for an extension due to "unavailability" 
of the state's witness, Mr. Garrett. 
Once determined that the 27th was to be vacated by the court, defense 
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counsel requested limiting the extension to two days (the 29th); however, the court 
declined, citing the court's planned attendance at a judicial conference. The first 
available date offered counsel, October 4th, was in conflict with counsel's scheduled 
appearance, under subpoena, to the U.S. District Court in Phoenix, .Arizona. (That fact 
is somewhat hidden in inaudible portions of the transcript; however, both counsel agreed 
in a subsequent hearing that that was the stated reason). (See R. 245). 
Judge Gowans entered no Finding of Fact in support of his "good cause" 
determination. 
In addition to Defendant's oral objections to continuation of the preliminary 
examination at the circuit court level, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss (re delays) in 
the District Court on February 16, 1989. The court denied the motion on March 14, 
1989. (R. 240) 
The Sixth Amendment and Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution 
require a speedy trial. Although the Sixth Amendment does not specifically extend to 
speedy preliminary hearings, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires 
dismissal of an indictment (or information) even if the delays are pre-indictment if the 
defendant can demonstrate prejudice and prosecutorial intent to gain an advantage. U.S. 
v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 321; accord State v. Renzo, 443 P.2d 392, 394 (Utah 1968). 
The federal courts do; however, recognize an absolute right founded in 
due process considerations and codified at Rule 5(c), Federal Rules of Criminal 
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Procedure, for either the return of a superseding indictment or the holding of a pre-
liminary hearing within ten days where the defendant is charged by Information. The 
strict remedy where neither occurs is dismissal. 
Utah law, like the federal code, mandates a "ten-day rule" for preliminary 
hearings; however, unlike the federal law, the right to a speedy preliminary hearing is 
expressly guaranteed by the Constitution of Utah at Article I, Section 13. 
In State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986), the court reversed a 
bindover of a defendant by applying the state due process clause, Article I, Section 7. 
The court's decision precluded the state's prosecutor from continuing a prosecution by 
refiling charges where it failed to present evidence which was available but not adduced 
at the first preliminary hearing. In doing so, the court adopted a requirement that the 
burden be placed upon the prosecution to show good cause to justify its actions under 
a due process standard. 
In the instant case we must examine essentially three continuances of the 
preliminary hearing. The first, as indicated, may be discounted as a good faith mis-
understanding of the state's prosecutor (Mr. Reed) which resulted in miscommunication 
to the defense which should have resulted in only a five day delay (from September 
22nd to 27th). 
The second delay; however, falls squarely into the ambit of Brickey; the 
third equally offends fundamental notions of justice and fair play. 
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A. THE UNAVAILABILITY OF AND/OR INCONVENIENCE TO 
A WITNESS AND/OR THE DIFFICULTY IN 
ARRANGING A LINEUP ARE INSUFFICIENT 
JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUANCE IN THIS CASE 
While witness unavailability may be good cause for a continuance, it is not 
in this case. The state cannot demonstrate its good faith to overcome the requirements 
under state constitutional and statutory law. Further, the court abused its discretion in 
apparently finding that good cause was demonstrated. 
First of all, the state only speculated that one witness (Mr. Garrett) might 
be unavailable. The prosecutor admitted that he had made no attempt to contact the 
witness to ascertain that fact. (R. 244, p.5, 1. 22-23). 
Second, the state had had ample time to contact Mr. Garrett since 
Defendant had been in custody for several months (in Virginia) awaiting extradition and 
had been in custody for two weeks in the Salt Lake County Jail awaiting prosecution. 
Third, both the state and the court were aware that the proposed date for 
preliminary examination (September 27th) was a full five days away, ample time to 
either secure the witness' attendance or come back before the court with a motion to 
continue based upon facts, not speculation. 
Fourth, Mr. Garrett, as defense counsel pointed out to the court, was only 
one of four eye witnesses and his testimony was therefor merely cumulative. 
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Fifth, as also pointed out to the court by defense counsel, Mr. Garrett had 
advised the police that he was unsure whether he could identify the suspect (s). (And, 
as it turned out, he could not.) 
Sixth, just as in the question of witness availability, the prosecution had 
made no attempt to arrange a lineup and could only speculate to the court that the jail's 
time limitations would probably preclude arranging a lineup within five days. 
In State v. Stillings, 709 P.2d 348, 349 (Utah 1985), a denial of speedy trial 
claim was affirmed by the Supreme Court because the Defendant had initiated a 
continuance of a trial date because "he was having difficulty locating witnesses." That 
same standard ought to apply to the state. 
This scenario is not unlike Brickey, (absent a first preliminary hearing.) In 
this case the state did not have to go forward with its evidence on September 27th even 
though it presented no evidence on October 6th that it could not have adduced within 
ten days. 
Ergo, not only did the state fail to meet its obligation, the court lacked 
sufficient bases to find good cause to extend the time period. 
To allow this abuse of discretion to go unchecked is to hold that the 
legislature's ten day limitation is merely a suggestion. 
B. THE UNAVAILABILITY OF THE JUDGE DUE TO 
A JUDICIAL CONFERENCE IS NOT GOOD 
CAUSE FOR AN EXTENSION 
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The third extension of the preliminary examination herein at the state's 
request was made more onerous by virtue of the court's refusal to limit the extension to 
only two days as requested by counsel for the reason that the court was planning to 
attend a judicial conference. 
The question is: Is a judicial conference a weightier consideration than an 
in-custody defendant's right to due process, particularly where he has already been in 
custody beyond ten days and has been denied a sooner hearing date at the stat's request, 
as well? 
A preliminary examination is a "critical stage" in the criminal process. State 
v. Anderson. 612 P.2d 778, 782 n.9 (Utah 1980), citing Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 
1 (1969). A judicial conference is neither a "critical stage" nor is attendance required 
78-3-27. Indeed, it has long been the policy of the Third Circuit Court to leave a 
"skeleton crew" from among its fifteen judges to cover the business of the courts. 
Even if Judge Gowans' attendance at the conference was essential, he could 
have assigned this case to another non-conferencing judge. In fact, he did assign the 
case to Judge Hutchings for preliminary hearing, eventually. 
A judicial conference might be adequate grounds for delay under the speedy 
trial statute's "as the business of the courts permits" standard but not under the "good 
cause shown" standard. This argument takes on greater import in light of the 
cumulative delay caused by the initial miscommunication by the state and the secondary 
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extension obtained by the state due to the claim of unavailability of the witness. 
In all, the three extensions were due to the state's and/or the court's 
problems, not to the defendant's requests or omissions. Indeed, the record clearly shows 
that the defendant objected to the state's requested continuance as well as the court's 
"judicial conference" delay. 
A line of Iowa cases provides an excellent overview of what is not good 
cause for delay. "(G) ood cause under the (speedy trial) statute is not established by 
showing judges, prosecutors or jurors are not available for some reason of court 
administration. To be an appropriate factor in showing good cause the unavailability 
must be the product of a sudden or unique and non-chronic event. State v. Newman, 
257 N.W.2d 29 (1976); State v. Goff, 244 N.W.2d 579 (1976) (good cause not 
established by unavailability of judges where one was sick, one was on vacation, and the 
remaining two had to serve eight different courthouses each week); State v. Leonard, 
240 N.W.2d 690 (1976) (good cause not established when the State was unable to try 
a case within the 60-day period because a trial judge on his own motion continued the 
trial date); State v. Wright, 234 N.W.2d 99(1975)(good cause not established by 
unavailability of judges due to chronic court congestion); State v. Hones, 224 N.W.2d 
156(1975) (good cause not established where a judge continued the case five days before 
the end of the 60-day period for trial because of discharge of a depleted jury panel). 
"The reason for these holding is plain. The legislature did not provide any 
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basis for excusing the state from its duty (under Iowa speedy trial statutes) simply 
because the delay is not the prosecutor's fault." (Referring to the above cited line of 
cases), as we observed in State v. Leonard, 240 N.W.2d at 692, the statutes reflect a 
public policy which the government has an affirmative duty to effectuate. The statutory 
rights to speedy indictment and trial are not merely rights of a defendant. They are a 
reflection of a legislative policy that charges be brought and tried within the allotted 
periods." State v. Hathaway, 257 N.W.2d 735, 738 (Iowa 1977). Also, "An administra-
tive breakdown in the prosecutor's office does not constitute good cause." State v. 
Sassman, 226 N.W.2d 808, 809 (Iowa 1975). 
The Iowa Supreme Court has also held that the burden to prove good cause 
is clearly on the state "and that a trial court's ruling which grants a delay must be 
clearly shown by a record which establishes those facts. "Trial court's ruling cannot be 
upheld on the basis of speculation. It has no support in the record." Williamson v. 
Casey, 220 N.W.2d 638, 640 (Iowa 1974); State v. LePlant, 244 N.W.2d 240, 242 (Iowa 
1976)). 
See also, State v. Nelson,, 222 N.W.2d 445, 449 (Iowa 1974). ("Every 
limitation statute sets an arbitrary date after which certain actions cannot be brought or 
certain rights cannot be enforced. One cannot escape the effect of such statutes by 
showing they were only violated a little bit.") 
Indeed, the chilling effect upon a defendant's rights are not lessened by the 
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fact that the state did not intend to violate his rights. 
Because of the insufficient bases for delay, the court lost its jurisdiction to 
proceed, just as it would in any other case where a statute imposes a limitation period. 
This court should therefor remand this case to the court below with instructions to grant 
Defendant's motion to dismiss. 
II. DEFENDANT SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO 
APPEAL THE ENTIRETY OF 
THE PRE-TRIAL DELAY ISSUE 
Perusal of the statement of facts and the record cited herein demonstrates 
that the record is confusing and unclear as to whether Defendant and his counsel 
reasonably misperceived the conditional plea agreement. 
It is undisputed that both sides agree that the extension of the preliminary 
hearing beyond ten days is a dispositive issue, (i.e. remand for dismissal), if the denial 
of Defendant's motion on that issue is reversed. 
However, if the court affirms the court below on the "ten-day rule" portion 
of Defendant's motion then th court must address the issue of the broader pre-trial 
delay issue. If the court holds that Defendant has a right to appeal on said issue it may 
ekher hold the cumulative delay to constitute reversible error and remand for dismissal 
or it may affirm on all issues, whereupon the defendant would be required to serve out 
his sentence. 
Alternatively, the court may affirm the court below on the preliminary 
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examination issue but remand the matter with an order allowing the defendant to 
withdraw his plea and face trial on the original charges. 
Defendant urges this court, in light of the silent and/or ambiguous record 
and the apparent misperception of the defendant, to hear this entire matter on its merits. 
Ill THE CHARGES AGAINST DEFENDANT SHOULD 
HAVE LIKEWISE BEEN DISMISSED 
FOR THE CUMULATIVE DELAY OF 
HIS SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHTS 
The U.S. Constitution, Amendments VI and XIV and the Constitution of 
Utah, Article I, Section 12, prohibit unnecessary and unreasonable delays in the trial 
process. In fact, the federal prohibitions have been codified at 18 U.S.C. 3161, (the 
Speedy Trial Act), requiring a trial in federal cases no later than 70 days from first 
appearance (whether in custody or not), unless special circumstances exist. 
The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was made applicable to the 
states in Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967). It is the affirmative "duty" of 
the state to prevent a speedy process when the Defendant is in custody. Smith v. Hooey, 
393 U.S. 374 (1969). 
The Supreme Court's dedication to the principles of the Sixth Amendment 
is evidenced by the harsh remedies it has employed. Strunk v. U.S., 412 U.S. 434 (1973) 
holds that dismissal is the "only" remedy if speedy trial has in fact been denied. 
Prejudice to the Defendant is but one factor to consider and it is not ever necessary to 
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an order of dismissal. Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25 (1973). 
77-1-6, Utah Code of Criminal Procedure, states: 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
(h) To . . . be entitled to a trial within 30 days 
after arraignment if unable to post bail and if 
the business of the courts permits. 
Rule 25 (77-35-25, Utah Code of Criminal Procedure), is the statutory 
authority for the court to grant Defendant's motion herein, in the furtherance of justice: 
"(b) The court shall dismiss the information . . . when: 
(1) There is unreasonable or unconstitutional delay in 
bringing the defendant to trial: 
(4) The court is without jurisdiction 
(d) . . . An order of dismissal based upon unconstitutional 
delay in bringing the defendant to trial . . . shall be a bar to 
any other prosecution for the offense charge. 
Is this delay unreasonable? Defendant was detained for three months prior 
to extradition. He then waited just short of a month before preliminary examination. 
After over another two months of being lost in the system he was finally arraigned. 
(The fault of the Third District Court bureaucratic miasma.) 
In State v. Trujillo, 656 P2d 403 (1982), the Utah Supreme Court denied 
Defendant's claim of denial of speedy trial rights because of delays due to last minute 
changes of plea complication by a Co-defendant. 
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Likewise, in State v. Stillings. supra, at 349, the defendant caused his own 
delay due to problems locating witnesses. 
The test for analyzing a claim of denial of a speedy trial right under the 
state and federal constitutions is enunciated similarly in State v. Miller, 747 P.2d 440 
(Utah App. 19887) and Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). 
Under the Barker-Miller balancing test the court examines both parties' 
conduct and weighs the following factors: (1) length of delay; (2) reasons for delay: (3) 
Defendant's assertions of the right to speedy trial; and (4) prejudice to the defendant. 
Miller, at 442; Barker, at 530. 
The record (supra) is clear that Defendant continually objected to extensions 
at the preliminary hearing stage and made numerous personal, telephonic and written 
demands for an arraignment in the District Court, moving for dismissal from and after 
said time. Those actions clearly fulfill the third factor of the Barker-Miller test. 
Steps one and two of the test need to be analyzed jointly: 
1. Initial custody: Defendant was in jail in Virginia and Utah for ap-
proximately 104 days before his first appearance in the Third Circuit before his first 
appearance in the Third Circuit Court. (June 1 to September 12, 1988). 
2. Pre-preliminary examination: Due to the above described continuances 
occasioned by (1) the Circuit Court/County Attorney miscommunication; (2) Mr. Walsh's 
speculative witness unavailability, and; (3) the judicial conference, preliminary 
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examination was delayed for another 24 days, (two weeks beyond the statutory 
limitation). (September 12 to October 6, 1988.) 
3. District Court arraignment: Originally set for October 17, 1988 but 
transferred due to recusal by the arraigning judge, a third delay of 67 days to the 
eventual arraignment date of December 12, 1988 occurred. 
Had trial been properly set within the 30-day limit at the initial District 
court arraignment, the last allowable date for trial would have been November 17, 1988, 
yet the miasma of the District Court's docketing system didn't even schedule an 
arraignment for an additional 25 days beyond that date and, then, only after defense 
counsel's urging. 
At arraignment, the first available trial date, February 1, 1989, was set. 
That date was 116 days after the preliminary, 105 days after the initially scheduled 
arraignment before Judge Rokich and still 50 days after the actual date of arraignment 
before Judge Uno. And, of course, the trial date was later bumped another 50 days by 
an ongoing trial in Judge Uno's court. 
An examination of the record shows that even after motions were filed in 
this case and/or conditional pleas were entered, additional delays were encountered due 
to over crowding of the court's law and motion calendar (March 13, 1989), failure of 
the jail staff to deliver Defendant to court (sentencing) and two failures by the clerk of 
the court to transfer the complete record on appeal to this court. 
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At some point the court has to say that the cumulative delay owing not to 
the fault of the defendant but due in part to the prosecutors and mostly due to the 
"business of the courts" is an unconscionable substantive violation of rights. It is not the 
"business of the courts" to simply lose Defendant's file (or whatever it was that caused 
the delay between the October 17th and December 12th arraignment dates). 
As to the final factor in the balancing test, i.e., prejudice, it should be 
noted that the decisive piece of evidence against Defendant (hair sample) was not even 
obtained until January of 1989, while the defendant was in custody for over seven 
months and well beyond the time he was guaranteed a trial date under the laws of Utah. 
Nor can it be gainsaid that Defendant's decision to enter into a conditional 
plea agreement was affected by a desire to alleviate the frustrations of interminable 
delays and cast his fate to the appeals process on the meritorious issues argued herein. 
CONCLUSION 
Either due to the violation of his statutory and constitutional rights to a 
speedy preliminary examination or due to the cumulative denial of his speedy trial rights 
accruing thereafter, this court should hold that the charges against Defendant should 
have been dismissed pursuant to his motion in the court below and should remand this 
matter for said remedy. 
Respectfully submitted this )U day of April, 1990. 
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